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This paper studies a balance whose unobservable fulcrum is not nec-
essarily located at the middle of its two pans. It presents three diﬀerent
models, showing how this lack of symmetry modiﬁes the observation, the
formalism and the interpretation of such a biased measuring device. It
argues that the biased balance can be an interesting source of inspiration
for broadening the representational theory of measurement.
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1Then, at last, as they were nearing the fountains for the fourth
time, the father of all balanced his golden scales and placed a doom in
each of them, one for Achilles and the other for Hector. As he held
the scales by the middle, the doom of Hector fell down deep into the
house of Hades- and then Phoebus Apollo left him.
Homer,I l i a dXXII
G i v em eap l a c et os t a n do n ,a n dIc a nm o v et h ee a r t h .
Archimedes
1 Introduction
The balance is a universal symbol for measurement and judgment. Osiris uses
a balance to measure the soul of the dead in ancient Egypt. In the Greek epic
tradition, deities like Apollo use a balance to decide of the fate of heroes. As
a measuring device, it is discussed by Plato, Aristotle, Euclid and Archimedes
(Heath 1897, Moody and Clagett 1960). It appears in the Bible as a symbol for
rigor and exactness and in the Koran as a symbol of supreme wisdom. It sym-
bolizes the invariable middle in ancient China, is part of the Sanskrit mythology
and of the Indian and Tibetan spiritual traditions (Chevalier and Gheerbrant
1969). In the middle ages, the balance was essential to evaluate the price of
goods and to allow for the development of trade (Kish 1965). Nowadays, it is a
symbol of justice all over the modern world. It is ubiquitous in the philosophy of
science (Campbell 1957, Ellis 1966, Carnap 1966) and is a seminal example for
the foundations of measurement (e.g. Krantz et al. 1971, Roberts 1979, Narens
1985). Undeniably, the equal-arm balance is a powerful model for the theory of
measurement and for the intuition of unbiased judgment.
To make more precise this importance, consider an equal-arm balance and
position an object, denoted x, on one of its pan and an object y on the other pan.
Suppose that you observe that “x is lower than y”. This observation is formally
described with a binary relation Â0 as “x Â0 y”. Add another object z to x.
You observe that “x with z are lower than y”. Since this happens for any object
z, the empirical regularity of such an observation leads to assume the following
property:
for all x,y,z we have xÂ0 y ⇒ (x ◦ z) Â0 y,
2where “◦” naturally means the operation of jointly positioning two objects on the
same pan of the balance. Further axioms then reﬂect the laws or regularities that
can be observed, including in particular the following independence property:
f o ra l lx ,y ,zw eh a v exÂ0 y ⇔ (x ◦ z) Â0 (y ◦ z).
With suﬃcient axioms, your task of measurement is then to prove the exis-
tence of a function, say ϕ, which assigns a number to each object such that an
object is lower than another on the balance if and only if it is assigned a greater
number. Formally, you prove that there exists a real-valued function ϕ such that
x Â0 y ⇐⇒ ϕ(x) >ϕ (y),
ϕ(x ◦ y)=ϕ(x)+ϕ(y).
Such a representation theorem is likely to build on Hölder’s theorem (see
Michell and Ernst 1996 for an English translation) and the theory of extensive
measurement (see Krantz et al. 1971, Chapter 3). Naturally, the number ϕ(x)
m e a n s“ t h em a s so fx”. The function ϕ is unique up to multiplication by a
positive constant and is called a ratio-scale (see Stevens 1946). Of course, many
predictions can be made based on this measurement. For instance, if the sum
of the mass of y and the mass of z is greater than the mass of x,y o up r e d i c t
with certainty that you will observe that “y with z is lower than x”. With this
simple model of the equal-arm balance, the observed relation between objects
does not depend on the measuring device and does not depend on the observer.
Also, the observed empirical relation is formalized with formal (non-numerical)
statements which univocally correspond with observation. Finally, a numerical
representation is provided which measures objects and the function alone suﬃces
to this measurement. As we will see in this paper, things are quite diﬀerent for
the biased balance.
A biased balance is a two-arm balance whose fulcrum is not necessarily located
at the middle of the two pans. Of course, the principle of the balance with unequal
arms has long been understood, at least since Archimedes’ proof of the principle
of the lever (Propositions 6 and 7 of Book I of On the equilibrium of the planes,
see Heath 1897 p. 192). Also, the so-called Roman or Steelyard balance, where
objects positioned on a tray at one end of the beam are balanced by moving a
c o u n t e r w e i g h ta l o n gt h eo p p o s i t es i d eo ft h eb e a m ,h a sb e e ne m p l o y e dt ow e i g h
large bodies from the earliest time. Not only the principle of the lever had to be
invoked, but also the account of the weight of the tray (or hook) used to hold
the object to be weighed, which induces some complications (see for instance the
Liber de Canonio in Moody and Clagett 1960). As shown in Suppes (1980), these
earlier mathematical approaches are very close to the contemporaneous theory
of conjoint measurement (Krantz et al. 1971, Chapter 6). What they share in
particular is that they start with two dimensions (here weights and distances)
3which can be manipulated independently in order to observe their conjoint eﬀect.
In particular, it is assumed possible to select the distances from the fulcrum so
that they are of appropriate proportions. Also, it is assumed that distances can
be divided into segments of equal length.
In this study of the biased balance, we do not assume that distance from the
fulcrum is an observable primitive. We rather assume that we only observe a
relation among objects and we then try to characterize the implicit role of the
bias. Hence, we do not start from two dimensions playing similar roles but with
one that is observable (the objects positioned on the balance) and infer the role
of the second that is not directly observable (the bias of the balance). Because of
the hidden role of the bias, the relation between objects presents less regularity.
Therefore, the axioms which formalize observation are more general than in the
traditional theory of measurement. This is why the biased balance is interesting
as a model to broaden the formal theory of measurement. This approach is also
a way to study the speciﬁcity of the bias as a property of the measuring device
rather than a property of the objects themselves. As such, it sheds light on the
extent to which we can measure the bias of a measuring device from the mere
observation of the behavior of the objects that such a device measures.
I present below three models of the biased balance which diﬀer by their as-
sumptions about what is observed and how it is observed. They present distinct
empirical regularities which correspond to diﬀerent set of axioms. I thus present
diﬀerent representation theorems which prove that, even with these irregularities,
a proper numerical measure of the mass of objects exists. These theorems reveal
a numerical factor which somehow “measures” these irregularities and which in-
tuitively corresponds to the bias of the balance. As the interpretation of such
number is not necessarily obvious, I make precise what it means and what it
measures. The biased balance hence leads to a more detailed analysis of the cor-
respondence between empirical observation and its formalization as a relational
structure. This step is usually taken for granted in the theory of representational
measurement, due to an implicit assumption of the symmetry of the measur-
ing device. More generally, the biased balance sheds light on three fundamental
questions:
1. How does empirical observation relate to its formal description?
2. What formal properties must be assumed in order to construct a numerical
representation of this formal description?
3. What is the meaning of such a numerical representation with respect to the
experimental setting which gives rise to empirical observation?
These questions are essential to a clear and precise understanding of the use
of numbers and of mathematical models in sciences. A most complete and sys-
tematic attempt to address them is found in the representational theory of mea-
surement. Because the biased balance shows how this theory may be broadened
4to apply to phenomena which do not present the typical empirical regularities
assumed by the symmetry of the measuring device, it contributes to address one
of its most interesting critique (e.g. Schwager 1991, Mari 2000, 2005, Boumans
2005).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I present the
basic terms and formal properties that I use to study a biased balance. I also
introduce the 3 models. In section 3, I present a ﬁrst model which shows some
dependence on the observer. This dependence arises because the model relies
on the distinction between observer’s left and right. Since it is the most general
model from the mathematical point of view, I present it ﬁrst, so that other models
can refer to its representation theorem. In section 4, I present a second model
which reﬂects some indeterminacy in observable behavior. This indeterminacy
is mainly due the assumption that the interaction between the objects and the
biased balance is not directly observable. In section 5, I present a third model
where I deﬁne some “extended objects” in order to explicitly take account of the
interaction with the balance. This model is a form of conjoint measurement. A
short section 6 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
In an experiment, the behavior of a biased balance is determined by three types
of considerations. First, there are the objects which are positioned on its pans.
Second, there is the measuring device, the balance itself, which has a speciﬁc
bias, i.e. whose fulcrum is located at a given place between the two pans. Third,
there is the allocation of objects to the pans. Indeed, given two objects and given
one biased balance, the behavior of the measuring device is not determined: it
depends on the respective positioning of the objects on the pans. This is the
interaction between the object and the balance.
We refer to observation as the visual perception of the behavior of the balance
by an observer when objects are positioned on the pans. We designate observa-
tions by pictures or by observational statements. Figure 1 shows three diﬀerent
ways to observe a particular behavior of a biased balance, with object x placed
on one pan and object y placed on the other pan. Each picture can be described
by the following observational statements:
(a1)“ x o nt h el e f ti sl o w e rt h a ny on the right”;
(a2) “x is lower than y”;
(a3) “x on pan #1 is lower than y on pan #2”.
Statement (a1) diﬀers from statement (a2) because it speciﬁes on which pan
each object is positioned. However, it does so in a manner which depends on the










“x on the left is lower 
than y on the right”
“x is lower
than y”
“x on pan #1 is lower 
than y on pan #2”
Figure 1: Three ways to describe the observation of the behavior of a biased
balance
speciﬁes on which pan each object is placed, but designates the pans in a manner
independent of the observer. We see below that these three observations lead to
three diﬀerent models.
Let us now consider the formalization of observations. We consider a set of
objects A and, as we have already done, we denote objects by x,y,z... ∈ A. We
designate by x ◦ y the object consisting of two objects x and y and we assume
that the operation ◦ is closed (for all x,y ∈ A, x ◦ y ∈ A), commutative (for all
x,y ∈ A, x◦y = y◦x) and associative (for all x,y,z ∈ A, x◦(y◦z)=( x◦y)◦z).
The set A e n d o w e dw i t hs u c ha no p e r a t i o ni sacommutative semigroup.F o r
m ∈ N∗, we deﬁne mx by 1x = x and mx =( m − 1)x ◦ x where N∗ stands
for the set of positive integers. Naturally, mx designs the object consisting of
m copies of x (note this already departs from the intuitive analysis where every
object is distinct). Further, we assume that A is homogeneous, i.e. that given
two objects x and y, there exist two positive integers m and n such that mx = ny
(note that this hypothesis implies that there is no object of null mass). As we
did in the introduction, we formalize the behavior of the balance with a binary
relation noted Â when the balance is not at equilibrium and ∼ when the balance
is at equilibrium. To characterize the observed regularities of each model and to
prove our representation theorems, we use diﬀerent properties for binary relations
on a commutative semigroup. Consider a binary relation R on a commutative
semigroup X, we use the following deﬁnitions:
• R is asymmetric if and only if, for all x,y ∈ X, xRy ⇒ not(yRx);
• R is symmetric if and only if, for all x,y ∈ X, xRy ⇒ yRx;
• R is complete if and only if, for all x,y ∈ X, xRy or yRx;
• R is transitive if and only if, for all x,y,z ∈ X, (xRy and yRz) ⇒ xRz;
6• R is positive if and only if, for all x,y,z ∈ X, xRy ⇒ (x ◦ z)Ry;
• R is non-trivial if and only if, for some x,y,z,t ∈ X, xRy and not(zRt);
• R is scale-invariant1 if and only if, for all x,y ∈ X and all m ∈ N∗,
xRy ⇔ mxRmy;
• R is independent2 if and only if, for all x,y,z ∈ X, xRy ⇔ (x ◦ z)R(y ◦ z);
• R is super-archimedean3 if and only if, for all x,y ∈ X, xRy ⇒ mxRny for
some m < n, with m,n ∈ N∗.
We also use the following deﬁnition, which characterizes the pairs for which
the relation R is not super-archimedean4:
• Ap a i r(x,y) ∈ X ×X is balanced if and only if xRy and not(mxRny) for
all m < n, with m,n ∈ N∗.
Formalizing the biased balance aims at clarifying the conditions under which
the existence and uniqueness of a function that measures objects, i.e. which
assigns a numerical value (their mass) to each of them, can be proved. Such a
function is denoted by ϕ and takes its values in the set of positive real numbers,
denoted R>0. This process of representing a relation which formalizes an observed
behavior by a relation among the numbers assigned to the objects is the one of
measurement. Another objective is to clarify the extent to which we can also
“measure” the measuring device itself, i.e. the bias of the balance. To this
purpose, our representations will reveal a factor, denoted α or β and belonging
to the set of positive real numbers. What such a factor means is a matter of
interpretation.
By interpretation, we refer to the correspondence between something per-
taining to an experimental setting with some formal symbol or statement, and
reciprocally. This comprises the formalization of a particular observation, or the
empirical meaning of a formal symbol or statement. This distinction between
interpretation and measurement is depicted in Figure 2, with the example of
statement (a1), anticipating our ﬁrst model below.
1This scale-invariance property is also called homotheticity and is the key structural property
of a biased balance.
2This standard property is also often called monotonicity.
3This is the term used by De Miguel et al. (1996) and that we adopted in Le Menestrel and
Lemaire (2006b).
4This property is inspired from the property of anomalous pairs in Fuchs (1963).
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Figure 2: Interpretation and Measurement
3 First model: A dependence on the observer
Consider a biased balance placed in front of you, the observer. Take two objects
x and y that are positioned on the left and right pan respectively. As pictured
in Figure 3, you may observe (a1), i.e. that “x on the left pan is lower than y
is on the right pan”. This is formally written x Â1 y. You may observe (b1), i.e.
that “the balance is at equilibrium when x is on the left pan and y on the right
pan”. This is written x ∼1 y. Both Â1 and ∼1 are binary relations deﬁn e do nt h e
set of objects A. If you observe neither of these two, then you must observe (c1),
i.e. that “y on the right pan is lower than x is on the left pan”. If %1 is deﬁned
as x %1 y ⇔ (x Â1 yo rx∼1 y), it formalizes that “x o nt h el e f tp a ni sl o w e r
when y is on the right pan or the balance is at equilibrium”. Therefore, you can
simply formalize that y on the right is lower than x as x 6%1 y.
Intuitively, the relation Â1 is positive,r e ﬂecting that mass is a positive quan-
tity. Also, both relations Â1 and ∼1 are scale-invariant: the behavior will not
change if you take m copies of x and of y (m ∈ N∗).F u r t h e r ,t h er e l a t i o nÂ1 is
super-archimedean but ∼1 is not. Indeed, if the balance is at equilibrium, it
will tilt as soon as the ratio of the number of copies is modiﬁed (below, we will
use this distinctive property to start from %1 and deﬁne the two relations Â1 and
∼1 from this primitive). Finally, we assume that the relation %1 is non-trivial,
i.e. that there exist at least two objects such that the balance tilts on the left
and two objects such that the balance tilts on the right.
What is surprising is that the relation Â1 is not necessarily asymmetric. We
would have (x Â1 ya n dyÂ1 x) when, for instance, x and y h a v et h es a m em a s s
8“y on the right is lower 
than x on the left”
“the balance is at equilibrium 
when x is on the left and y is 
on the right”
“x on the left is lower 
than y on the right”
(a1) (c1) (b1)





Figure 3: The 3 possible outcomes of an experiment with a biased balance (model
1)
and the left arm is longer. As for the relation ∼1, it is not necessarily symmetric:
we may have (x ∼1 ya n dy6∼1 x). This will happen when arms have diﬀerent
lengths. Also, the relations Â1and ∼1 are not necessarily transitive: when the
left arm is longer, we may have (x Â1 y, y Â1 za n dx6Â1 z) and also (x ∼1 y,
y ∼1 za n dx6∼1 z). Further, the relation %1 is not necessarily complete: we may
have (x 6%1 ya n dy6%1 x). This will happen, for instance, if x and y have the
same mass and the right arm is longer. Finally, the relation %1 is not necessarily
independent because of a possible lever eﬀect.
In terms of the formal properties of the primitive relations Â1 and ∼1, this
model is thus very general. Despite this generality, we can prove the existence
and uniqueness of a numerical function that measures the mass of the objects.
We can also provide some sort of measurement of the bias of the balance. This is
shown in the following representation theorem:
Theorem 1 Let A be a commutative semigroup endowed with a nontrivial
binary relation %1 that is positive and scale-invariant. Write x ∼1 y if and only
if (x,y) is balanced and x Â1 y if and only if (x %1 ya n dx6∼1 y). Suppose A
is homogeneous. Then there exist a function ϕ : A → R>0 a n dan u m b e rα>0
such that we have
x Â1 y ⇐⇒ αϕ(x) >ϕ (y),
x ∼1 y ⇐⇒ αϕ(x)=ϕ(y),
ϕ(x ◦ y)=ϕ(x)+ϕ(y).
Moreover, ϕ is unique up to multiplication by a positive constant and α is unique.
9Proof. Suppose there is no balanced pair, then the theorem above amounts
to Theorem 1 in Le Menestrel & Lemaire (2006b). If there are balanced pairs,
then %1 is not super-archimedean and we can use Theorem 2 in Le Menestrel
& Lemaire (2006b). The additive property (ii) is easily obtained from the
homogeneity property. To see this, take x,y ∈ A. There exist m,n such that






A simple corollary of this theorem implies that, in a homogeneous setting,
any positive and scale-invariant relation is either asymmetric and transitive, or
complete. It is transitive and complete (and then not asymmetric) if and only
if the balance is not biased. Also, note that if there are no balanced pairs,
no equilibrium can be observed. In that case, the relation ∼1 is empty and we
have %1= Â1 . In this homogeneous setting, the factor α is then necessarily an
irrational number5.
The function ϕ is naturally interpreted as measuring the mass of the objects.
Contrary to Mari (2000), it is not because the primitive relation is intransitive
that numerical measurement is necessarily impossible. Indeed, Theorem 1 shows
that measurement of the ratio of two masses is possible, in line with the deﬁnition
of measurement given by Michell (2005, p. 287).
For you, the observer, if the number α measures the distance between the
fulcrum and the left pan,t h e nt h ed i s t a n c eb e t w e e nt h ef u l c r u ma n d
the right pan is 1. These lengths are unique up to multiplication by a positive
constant: they constitute a ratio-scale.
The factor α cannot be directly interpreted as measuring “the bias of the
balance” because the same experiment (i.e. same objects, same balance, same
interaction) may lead to another formalization. Consider an observer 10 placed on
the other side of the balance. He would follow the same instructions to formalize
his observations. However, when you observe outcome (a1) and formally write
x Â1 y, he would observe outcome (c1) and write y 6%10 x. In his representation,
he would obtain a factor α0 = 1
α that he would wrongly interpret as measuring
“the bias of the balance”. Because “the bias of the balance” may take two distinct
values, the numerical factor α shall rather be interpreted as reﬂecting “the bias
of the balance from the point of view of the observer”.
Note that such a dependence can be avoided by formalizing that an object
tilts the balance independently of the pan on which it is positioned. Suppose
that we observe that x o nt h el e f ti sl o w e rt h a ny on the right and that x
on the right is lower than y on the left. We then write x À1 y (formally, we
5Reciprocally, we show in Le Menestrel and Lemaire 2006b that if α is irrational, then no
equilibrium exists. Note also that in the absence of equilibrium, i.e. if and only if α is irrational,
we cannot be certain with a ﬁnite number of observations that two objects have the same mass
in a homogeneous setting. Hence, the assumption that we dispose of identical copies of an object
x becomes especially important.
10“the balance is 
at equilibrium”








“y is lower than  x”
xy
(b2)
Figure 4: The 3 possible observations of an experiment with a biased balance
(model 2)
have x À1 y ⇔ (x Â1 ya n dy6%1 x)). The relation À1 does not have the
same properties than the relation Â1: it is necessarily asymmetric and transitive.
Hence, the factor α is necessarily lower or equal to 1 and the corresponding
representation is x À1 y ⇐⇒ αϕ(x) >ϕ (y) with 0 <α6 1. An example of
interpretation of À1 distinct from the biased balance consists in formalizing the
weighing of objects by hand. One tends to permute objects in the hands in order
to get rid of a possible bias when assessing that an object has a greater mass
than the other. The procedure leaves out objects whose masses are close, and
this lack of discrimination results in a form of “intransitive indiﬀerence” with
a proportional threshold of just noticeable diﬀerence referred to as Weber’s law
(See Le Menestrel and Lemaire 2004 who refer to this interpretation. See also
the models in Le Menestrel 2006a and Lemaire and Le Menestrel 2006).
4 S e c o n dm o d e l : A ni n d e t e r m i n a c yi no b s e r v -
able behavior
We consider next a balance placed parallel to your axis of vision. You the observer
see which object is lower, if any, but do not observe on which pan each object
is positioned. When object x is placed on one pan of the balance and object y
on the other pan, you may observe (a2), i.e. that “x is lower than y”, and you
would write it as x Â2 y (Figure 4). You may observe (b2), i.e. that “the balance
is at equilibrium”, that you would formalize as x ∼2 y. Finally, you may observe
(c2), i.e. that “y is lower than x” which you would write y Â2 x. Compared with
the previous model, the distinction left and right does not apply. Because you
11cannot observe on which pan each object is placed, it is not possible to control
the permutation of two objects when preparing an experiment.
Suppose that you observe that object x is lower than object y. Of course, it
does not mean that the mass of x is greater than the mass of y. Suppose now that
you make a second observation, and that this time, with the same balance and
t h es a m eo b j e c t s ,y o uo b s e r v et h a tx and y a r ea te q u i l i b r i u m . T h e n ,y o uc a n
infer that x i n d e e dh a sag r e a t e rm a s st h a ny, that x was positioned on the longer
pan in the ﬁrst experiment, and that x was positioned on the shorter pan in the
second experiment. From two distinct observations, one being an equilibrium, we
just showed how to acquire some information about the interaction between the
objects and the measuring device, even though such interaction is not directly
observable. Two such observations allow to make deterministic predictions. For
instance, the combination of x and another object is necessarily lower than y.
Note also that if you had observed y lower than x in the second experiment, you
could only have inferred that x and y have masses that do not diﬀer “too much”,
without gaining information about the interaction with the measuring device nor
being able to make deterministic predictions.
Formally, the relation %2 designates the union of the relations Â2 and ∼2 and
can again be deﬁned as x %2 y ⇔ (x Â2 yo rx∼2 y). A si nm o d e l1 ,t h er e l a t i o n
Â2 is positive and super-archimedean,a n dt h er e l a t i o n sÂ2 and ∼2 are scale-
invariant.T h er e l a t i o nÂ2 is not necessarily asymmetric and neither Â2 nor ∼2
are necessarily transitive. On the other hand, the relation ∼2 is symmetric,
reﬂecting that we cannot distinguish between objects at equilibrium. Also, the
relation %2 is complete (either one object tilts the balance, or the balance is at
equilibrium).
Even if it does not depend on the observer, this model has less mathematical
generality than model 1. Its representation, which derives from the representation
of the ﬁrst model, reveals a factor greater or equal to 1:
Theorem 2 Let A be a commutative semigroup endowed with a nontrivial
binary relation %2 that is positive, scale-invariant and complete. Write x ∼2 y
if and only if (x,y) is balanced or (y,x) is balanced, and x Â2 y if and only if
(x %2 ya n d(x,y) is not balanced). Suppose A is homogeneous. Then there exist
af u n c t i o nϕ : A → R>0 and a number α > 1 such that we have
x Â2 y ⇐⇒ αϕ(x) >ϕ (y),









Moreover, ϕ is unique up to multiplication by a positive constant and α is
unique.
12Proof. This is a corollary of Theorem 1.
Note that the symmetry of the relation ∼2 stems from its symmetrical deﬁ-
nition which diﬀers from the one in model 1. This is because x and y may put
the balance at equilibrium while the pair (y,x) i sn o tb a l a n c e d . W eh a v et h e
peculiar property that the relations Â2 and ∼2 are not disjoint, i.e. we may have
x Â2 ya n dx∼2 y. Because of this, it is not possible in this model to know with
certainty that the balance is not biased6.
The function ϕ has the same interpretation as in model 1. For you the observer,
if the number α is interpreted as measuring the longer arm,t h e nthe shorter
arm is of length 1. These lengths constitute a ratio-scale. Of course, since we
cannot observe the arms, it is not possible to say which one is the longer arm or
the shorter.
Apart from the cases where deterministic predictions can be made, one does
not know which outcome is going to be observed in this model. This indetermi-
nacy is not due to insuﬃcient knowledge about the objects, nor to insuﬃcient
knowledge about the measuring device, but to a lack of knowledge about the in-
teraction between the objects and the measuring device. What appears, from the
point of view of the observer, as the same “observable cause” (two given objects
on a given measuring device), does not lead to the “same observable eﬀect.” This
illustrates a violation of procedural invariance where two substantially equivalent
settings are not empirically equivalent (see e.g. Quine 1975). In other words,
observation depends on how the measuring device treats the objects.7
Note that the three statements x Â2 y, x ∼2 y and y Â2 x which describe
the possible observations in this model are not mutually exclusive. Hence, the
correspondence between observational statements and formal statements is not
one-to-one. A formal statement may have two distinct meaning in terms of ob-
servational statements. For instance, if the observational statement “x is lower
than y” necessarily leads to the formal statement x Â2 y, the formal statement
x Â2 y does not mean that we will necessarily observe that “x is lower than y”.
It merely means that observing that “x is lower than y”i spossible. I ti sa si f
there were a time asymmetry in the sense that a formal statement can correspond
either to a statement of fact (a description of an observation that took place in
the past) or to a statement of possibility (a prediction of an observation that may
take place in the future).8
6Here, our intuition suggests that observing an equilibrium between x and y in a large
number of experiments probably means that the balance is not biased, and that x and y have
the same mass. But this necessitates a probabilistic approach, with an hypothesis about the
random generating process assigning objects to the pans. This would be an interesting avenue
for further research with links with probabilistic models.
7This should be speciﬁcally interesting for the modeling of preferences, which are often
dependant on the process by which they are constructed (e.g. Slovic, 1995, Kahneman and
Tversky 2000, and also Sen 1986, Le Menestrel and Wassenhove 2001).
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Figure 5: The 3 possible outcomes of an experiment with a biased balance (model
3)
The relation %2 can be easily obtained from the relation %1 of the ﬁrst model.
Observing that x is lower than y means that either x o nt h el e f ti sl o w e rt h a n
y on the right, or x on the right is lower than y on the left. Formally, we have
x %2 y ⇔ (x %1 yo ry6%1 x). More precisely, the relation %2 is formally the
converse of the negation of the relation À1: we have x %2 y ⇔ y 6À1 x. Note that
the relation À1 itself is not directly observable in this model. However, it can be
derived from observation in some particular cases. For instance, we may observe
(x Â2 ya n dy∼2 x) and deduce that x ◦ z À1 y for all z ∈ A. In this manner,
the relation À1 characterizes the pairs for which a deterministic prediction can
be made.
5 Third model: Extending the deﬁnition of ob-
jects to include the measuring device
In this model, we consider an observer who can identify each pan of the balance,
calling them #1 and #2. Hence, the distinction between the two pans of the
balance is observable (contrary to model 2) and is independent of the observer
(contrary to model 1). The principle of this model resides in extending the deﬁ-
nition of objects in order to include their interaction with the measuring device.
We consider the pair composed of object x and of pan #1 as being an extended
Bitbol 1988).
14object a n dw ed e n o t ei ta s(x,1). The possible observations of an experiment are
pictured in Figure 5. You may observe that “x on pan #1 is lower than y on pan
#2”, which is written (x,1) Â3 (y,2). You may observe that “y on pan #2 is
lower than x on pan #1”, which is written (y,2) Â3 (x,1). Finally, you observe
that “the balance is at equilibrium when x is on pan #1 and y on pan #2”, writ-
ten (x,1) ∼3 (y,2), i fa n do n l yi fn o n eo ft h et w op r e v i o u so u t c o m e sa r eo b s e r v e d .
Intuitively, the analysis of this setting is identical to the one of the ﬁrst setting.
This is because such an intuitive analysis is carried out from the point of view of
the observer and, from such a point of view, calling the arms “left” and “right”
or “pan #1” and “pan #2” does not make any diﬀerence. We will now see that
that the formalization is however very diﬀerent.
In order to reﬂect observation properly, we cannot simply deﬁne the relations
Â3 on the set A×{1,2}. We want to reﬂect formally that, for instance, (x,1) Â3
(y,1) is neither true or false but simply not observable because x and y are not
on two diﬀerent pans. We therefore need a slightly modiﬁed deﬁnition of what a
relation is.
Let B =( A1 × A2) ∪ (A2 × A1) where Ai = A ×{ i} with i ∈ {1,2}.W e
deﬁne Â3 as a subset of B and we say that Â3 is restrained 9 to B. We can deﬁne
the equilibrium relation ∼3 from the relation Â3 as: for all (x,y) ∈ B, for all
i ∈ {1,2},(x,i) ∼3 (y,3 − i) ⇔ ((x,i) 6Â3 (y,3 − i) and (y,3 − i) 6Â3 (x,i)). As
in model 1, the relation %3 designates the union of the relations Â3 and ∼3 and
is deﬁned as, for all x,y ∈ A and all i ∈ {1,2} :( x,i) %3 (y,3 − i) ⇔ ((x,i) Â3
(y,3 − i) or (x,i) ∼3 (y,3 − i)).
As in the other models, the relation Â3 is positive and super-archimedean,
and the relations Â3 and ∼3 are scale-invariant. However, in this model, the re-
lation Â3 is asymmetric (∼3 is symmetric by construction).10 Finally, remark
that these relations remain not independent.
As one may have guessed, this model leads to a somehow standard (i.e. not
biased) representation:
Theorem 3 Let A be a commutative semigroup. Let Ai = A ×{ i} (i ∈
{1,2}) and B =( A1 × A2) ∪ (A2 × A1) ⊂ A ×{ 1,2}. Let Â3 be a non-trivial
binary relation restrained to B that is asymmetric, positive, scale-invariant and
super-archimedean. Suppose that A is homogeneous. Then there exist a function
ϕ : A → R>0 and two numbers β1,β2 ∈ R>0 such that, for all x,y ∈ A, all
i ∈ {1,2}, we have
(x,i) Â3 (y,3 − i) ⇐⇒ βiϕ(x) >β 3−iϕ(y),
ϕ(x ◦ y)=ϕ(x)+ϕ(y),
9For all x,y ∈ A, for all i ∈ {1,2}, (x,i) Â3 (y,3 − i) ⇔ ((x,i),(y,3 − i)) ∈ B(Â3) ⊆ B.
Remark that B ⊂ (A ×{ 1,2})2 hence Â3 is not ar e l a t i o nd e ﬁned on A ×{ 1,2}.
10Because the relation is restrained, the formulation of the transitivity property does not
make much sense at this stage.
15β1 + β2 =1 .
Moreover, the pair (β1,β2) is unique and the function ϕ is unique up to
multiplication by a positive constant.
Proof. Deﬁne the binary relation ∼3 restrained on B by: for all (x,y) ∈ B,
for all i ∈ {1,2},(x,i) ∼3 (y,3−i) ⇔ ((x,i) 6Â3 (y,3−i) and (y,3−i) 6Â3 (x,i)).
Deﬁne also the relation %3 restrained on B as: for all (x,y) ∈ B,for all i ∈ {1,2} :
(x,i) %3 (y,3 − i) ⇔ ((x,i) Â3 (y,3 − i) or (x,i) ∼3 (y,3 − i)). Now, from Â3,





3 y ⇔ (x,i) Â3 (y,3 − i).
Both relations verify conditions of Theorem 1. Hence, for i =1 ,2, there exists
a ratio-scale ϕi : A → R>0 and a constant αi ∈ R>0 such that
x Â
i
3 y ⇔ βiϕi(x) > (1 − βi)ϕi(y).
Because each ϕi is unique up to multiplication by a positive scalar, we can













3 y ⇒ x %i
3 y, we have
βiϕ(x) > (1 − βi)ϕ(y) ⇒ (1 − β3−i)ϕ(x) > β3−iϕ(y),




1−β2, i.e. if β2 =1 −β1. The uniqueness conditions
are clear.
Naturally, the numbers β1 and β2 are interpreted as measuring the distance
between the fulcrum and pans #1 and #2 respectively. In this model, these
numbers are assigned to a variable that was part of the primitives (namely the two
pans). We have here an instance of conjoint measurement, which is indeed close to
the distributive triples in Luce and Narens (1985). To make the standard nature
of the representation even more explicit, we deﬁne the function Φ : A×{1,2} →
R>0 as
Φ(x,i)=βiϕ(x).
Then, the binary relation %3 restrained on B can be uniquely extended to a
relation %3 that is complete and transitive (i.e. a weak order) on A×{1,2}. For
all x,y ∈ A and all i,j ∈ {1,2},we let
(x,i) %3 (y,j) ⇔ Φ(x,i) > Φ(y,j).
16In this manner, it is possible to obtain a standard representation without a
bias but with a two-attribute function: one attribute for the object and one for
its extension, i.e. the pan of the balance on which it is placed. Finally, when the
interaction between the objects and the balance can be part of the deﬁnition of
objects, then the representation of the biased balance is not really biased!
6C o n c l u s i o n
What would have happened had Apollo not taken his scales by the middle? What
do we observe with a biased measuring device? How can we formalize it and how
interpretation relate formalism and observation?
This paper provides a rigorous analysis of experiments where objects and a dis-
symmetric measuring device combine to produce an observable phenomenon. It
illustrates how measurement is possible even when the observed relation between
objects is incomplete, intransitive or does not verify independence. It also shows
how interpretation of observation may lead to a formalism that is dependent on
t h eo b s e r v e r( m o d e l1 )o rt os o m ei n d e t e r m i n a c yi no b s e r v a b l eb e h a v i o r( m o d e l
2). Finally, it clariﬁes minimal conditions under which it is possible to treat
the interaction with the measuring device as one dimension of some “extended
objects” (model 3). The resulting form of “biased measurement” illustrated by
the biased balance extends measurement to relational structures that cannot be
represented by a function only, but can be represented by a function and a bias.
The biased balance also allows to study the relation between measurement and
empirical observation in more details. It illustrates how a biased measuring device
which is not directly observable inﬂuences the observed relation between objects,
and it shows how such a measuring device can be measured. In this respect, it
provides an intuitive grasp to the distinctive roles played by the observer, the
measuring device and the objects, notions which usually pertain to the theory
of quantum mechanics (e.g. von Neumann 1955) or to the philosophy of science
(e.g. Suppes 1993).
A formal limitation of this paper resides in the homogeneity assumption.
We hence work with Bertrand Lemaire on proving similar representation theo-
rems in a non-homogeneous setting. In terms of the biased balance, this would
clarify whether such a device can theoretically distinguish between pairs in a
non-homogeneous set, such as for instance cubes whose aretes are of length 1 and
spheres of diameter 1. Also, I believe that a link with probabilistic models should
also be of interest. Finally, Theorem 3 may lead to an interesting generalization,
for instance considering the case of a balance with n pans11.
11This would generalize of the notion of a Grassman structure (see Suppes et al. 1989, p.
229)
17Finally, I believe that the biased balance can also be a powerful model for the
study of biased judgments. Human beings cannot be viewed as deities who judge
things without biases, an assumption which is however the cornerstone of rational
behavior as maximization of a utility function. Human judgements involve both
some observable objects and the subject himself, who is looking at the objects
with his speciﬁc values, in a manner that can be speciﬁct ot h es i t u a t i o na th a n d .
It is as if the subject constructs his preferences by positioning himself towards
the objects he judges. These models of the biased balance should help to better
reﬂect how such attitudes inﬂuence preferences. At last, it could also provide a
measurement theoretic approach for studies that combine observation of behavior
with observation of the human brain (De Martino et al. 2006).
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